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EXCESSIVE DEMANDS ON HEALTH AND SOCIAL
SERVICES: s. 19(1)(a)(ii) IMMIGRATIONACT-
WHAT IS THE STANDARD TO SPONSOR
INFIRM AND ELDERLY PARENTS?
Kenneth H. Post*
R#SUMk
Les personnes figees et les personnes handicap~es qui sont parrain6es comme
faisant partie de la categorie de la famille peuvent ne pas 8tre admissibles si
on estime, de mani~re raisonnable, que leurs handicaps medicaux
representent une charge trop lourde pour les services de sant6 et les services
sociaux canadiens. L'auteur met l'accent sur deux aspects de la non-
admissibilit6 medicale en vertu de l'article S.19(1)(a)(ii). Tout d'abord la
notion de demande excessive est sans fondement rationnel et, deuxi~mement,
l'exclusion de parents Ag6s a cr66 des mdcanismes d'admission
systematiques et arbitraires.
INTRODUCTION
The policy of the Immigration Act, 1978 [hereinafter the Act] has an explicit
objective of facilitating "the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens and
permanent residents with their close relatives from abroad".1 Yet section
11(1) of the Act requires taking a medical examination and section
19(1)(a)(ii) forbids entry to those suffering health impairments which "might
reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on health or social
services." Thus, "family members, as defined in the Immigration Act and
Regulations, must by law be accepted as permanent residents"; but this is
"provided they pass health and security requirements."2 Since elderly parents
are more likely to be inadmissable on medical grounds than other people, the
Act seems to be ordered to thwart its own purposes. This paper explores how
the process of determination of medical inadmissability works below and the
problems in that process for those who are clearly infirm.
* Copyright © 1992 Kenneth H. Post, 3rd year law student at University of Toronto.
1. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s.3(c) [hereinafter the Act].
2. Immigration Regulations, 1978 -Amendment, C. Gaz.Nov. 2, 1991. 13578.
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Inspite of the likelihood that elderly parents will be denied admission for
medical reasons, immigration rates for the elderly imply that significant
numbers are gaining admission. To date, this suggests that the actual practice
of the Immigration Department is following an alternate route: elderly
parents are being admitted on humanitarian and compassionate grounds and
then given a Minister's Permit. This practice raises the question why the
Immigration Act or Regulations should not simply be altered to permit
automatic entry for sponsored, elderly, infirm parents without requiring any
medical checks at all.3 The answer would likely be that by rendering elderly
parents inadmissible and then as a matter of policy using discretion to allow
admission, it is much easier to change policy and immediately alter admis-
sion. In other words, the Federal Government wants the option to quietly and
quickly change its mind. While some immigration lawyers would maintain
that discretion is more often not exercised in favour of the infirm elderly, it
would be untrue to say that it is rarely if ever exercised in this way.
Nonetheless a number of recent changes and proposed changes may imply a
policy of greater restrictiveness which could easily and inobtrusively be
implemented. The "impact statement" of the proposed new Regulations4
explain that an unintended effect of the 1978 Regulations5 was that "Greater
numbers of sponsored parents were seeking to emigrate to Canada with
greater numbers of their own children."6 It goes on to report in dismay that
"at one post in 1989 the number of applications from older parents doubled." 7
The weaknesses in procedures noted in the first section of this essay may
therefore become more important as grounds of appeal. Moreover, the more
general recommendation that automatic entry be granted elderly parents
regardless of their condition takes on new importance. It would save the costs
of the entire process which appears to be largely unnecessary insofar as the
policy is to admit elderly parents; it would end the agony of uncertainty and
bureaucratic delay; and it would establish elderly parents' right of entry free
from invisible shifts in policy and discretion.
On June 25, 1992 substantial changes to theActwere proposed by the Federal
Government. The changes were accompanied by a major press release,
3. Immigration Act, supra, note 1; Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172 [here-
inafter the Regulations].
4. Supra, note 2.
5. Supra, note 3.
6. Supra, note 2 at 3579.
7. Ibid
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background paper and summary the thrust of which was to focus attention
on changes in the rules concerning refugees and business immigrants. 8
Medical inadmissibility is a very small part of the proposed changes. The
significant changes in this area are first to remove ambiguity around the
authority of medical officers and visa officers in determining medical inad-
missibility. Secondly, the government has promised to cease using "disabled"
when referring to the infirm; but it remains to be seen what substantial
difference this will make in admissions. Thirdly, the apparent shift in author-
ity is accompanied by an admission that the criteria used by medical officers
in determining what constitutes an "excessive demand on health and social
services" requires definition. This admission is supported by the argument
of this paper which shows in detail how ambiguous that definition is at
present. But further definition will have to wait for "consultation" and hence
for new regulations. 9 The Annual Report to Parliament Immigration Plan
For 1991-1995 Year Two promised a report on medical admissibility would
be "released shortly" which has yet to occur.10 Thus the government clearly
recognizes the problem indicated by this paper (and has at least since 1986);
yet, it is slow to rectify it. And, as we show below, by increasing the authority
of the medical officers it actually exacerbates the problem by giving more
authority to those less able to exercise it properly. It is hoped that this paper
can contribute to that current consultative process.
By focussing this essay on infirm, elderly parents, we focus on an area likely
to be of increasing concern since the parents of the large group of immigrants
between 1965 and 1975 will need care. This is an area in which none of the
usual arguments for immigration exist except that it is the humane and
compassionate thing to do. When that element is absent the immigration
regime is capable of the callous treatment accorded those in the Mong11 and
Ng12 cases described below.
8. Bill C-86, An Act to amend the Immigration Act and other Acts in consequence
thereof, 3d Sess., 34th Par., 1991-92 (First reading, June 16, 1992); Minister of
Employment and Immigration, Press Release with Background (June 16, 1992);
Employment and Immigration Canada, Managing Immigration: a framework for the
1990's -IM 199/6/92 (Public Enquiries Centre, Employment and Immigration Can-
ada).
9. Ibid. Press Release with Background at 6; Managing Immigration at 19.
10. Employment and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament "Immigration
Plan for 1991-1995, Year Two", (November, 1991) at 12.
11. Mong v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1988), 5 Imm. L.R. (2d) 121
(I.A.B.) [hereinafter Mong].
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Parents often have some kind of disabling condition which is nonetheless not
a threat to the health and safety of others. Thus only the second ground of
medical inadmissibility is relevant: the ground of excessive demands on
health or social services. It also means the focus is not on independent
immigrants but on those sponsored by family members. These three charac-
teristics-that elderly parents are likely to be ruled inadmissible for fear that
they will cost taxpayers money, that they need care, and that they are
sponsored by Canadian family members-focusses our attention on two
aspects of medical inadmissibility: 1) that the ground of excessive demand
on health or social services, while perhaps intuitively making sense, is
without rational basis in the application of the law; 2) and that the undoubted
inhumanity of excluding elderly parents has created relatively systemmatic
discretionary mechanisms for admission.
I. APPLICATIONS FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCY BY
SPONSORED PARENTS
A. Authorization
Infirm parents seek entry as sponsored members of the "family class".
Section 114(1) of the Act authorizes regulations to be made regarding those
who could include parents of citizens or permanent residents and the Regu-
lations (s. 4(1)(b)) authorize the sponsorship of parents for landing. 13 The
purposes of theAct are manifest in the Regulations which accord first priority
to processing of members of the family class: s.3(a). The term "family class"
is defined implicitly by sections 4-6 of the Regulations.
B. Practical Considerations
Section 9(1) of the Act requires sponsored parents to apply from outside of
Canada. However, because elderly and infirm parents require the help of their
children as quickly as possible, it is possible that, if they are visiting their
children, they could decide to immigrate from within Canada and stay with
their children during the process. This is not to recommend entering Canada
by deception. The punishment for even counselling such a thing is described
in s.94 of theAct. But the considerations which allow application from within
Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds are the same consider-
ations that at the end of the process of application for permanent residency
12. Ng v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1986), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 307 at 316
(I.A.B.) [hereinafterNg].
13. Regulations, supra, note 3. These Regulations have also been incorporated in a pol-
icy manual called Immigration Manual: Legislation (Ottawa: Employment and
Immigration Canada), [hereinafter IL Manual].
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will allow the parents to receive Minister's Permits. As well, this practice, is
now relatively common. Therefore, because of the time it takes to gain
approval for entry into Canada, such a method of immigration has much to
recommend it, particularly for citizens of those countries not requiring
visitor's visas. The list of such countries is authorized by s.13(1) and listed
under Schedule II of the Regulations. This is, of course, provided that the
infirmity is neither too advanced nor too debilitating so as to prevent entry
as a visitor under the Act.
C. Procedure
Thus by authority s.114(2) of the Act an exemption from the requirement to
apply from outside Canada may be granted and thelE and IS immigration policy
Manuals so direct officers. 14 Note however, as Mr. Justice Jerome points out at
length in the Yhap decision, 15 that the immigration policy manuals are guidelines
only for matters which are largely discretionary. They must not be adhered to so
as to completely fetter the visa officer's discretion. Moreover, it is interpretive
and hence may be wrong in substantial matters of law. At this point however the
IEManual's guidance seems unobjectionable. Applications for exemption from
applying from outside Canada are submitted on form IMM 1454.16 Discretion
to allow those who are medically inadmissible to apply from within Canada is
permitted. 17 Under s.114(2) the reasons for allowing application from within
Canada are to be either humanitarian and compassionate or public policy
grounds. Because we are concerned with those who are infirm and likely to be
denied admissibility on medical grounds, the same humanitarian and compas-
sionate reasons likely to result in Minister's Permits being granted, once the
applicant has been ruled medically inadmissible, form the reasons for being
allowed to apply from within Canada: see IS Manual Chapter 10, paragraph
10.263.18
Crucial among those humanitarian and compassionate grounds will be facts
established by the requirements for applying for Permanent Residency. An
undertaking must be made to support the parents in which it is proved that
14. Along with Immigration Manual: Legislation, Ibid there are 2 other policy manu-
als: Immigration Manual: Examination and Enforcement [hereinafter LE Manual] at
c.9; Immigration Manual: Selection and Controls [hereinafter IS Manual].
15. Yhap v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1990), 9 Imm.LR (2d) 243 at
261 (F.C.T.D.).
16. 1EManual, ibid. at c.9, para. 9.12.1.
17. Ibid. at c.9, para. 9.10.4.
18. ISManua4 supra, note 14.
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the sponsor possesses finances above the low income cut-off figure in accord
with s.10(2) of the Regulations and as developed by IS Manual Chapter 4,
paragraph 4.26-4.27.19 Other considerations of consequence may be gleaned
from cases in which there were appeals from medical inadmissibility on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Thus in Mong,20 a case involving
medical inadmissibility of the sponsor's mother who was diagnosed with
senile dementia at age 61, the character of the country (poor, tyrannical and
discriminatory against this ethnic group), the pennilessness of the parents,
the regular sending of money by the sponsor to the parents, the sponsor's
wife's training in gerontology, the strong desire of the sponsor and his wife
to have his parents live with them, and the possibility that the mother's
condition may have improved were all factors of consequence. The applica-
tion in this case took two years to be rejected and three years for a decision
on appeal, a shocking length of time, especially considering the vulnerability
of the applicants. Mean times for processing may be found in IS Manual
Chapter 4, Appendix A, Annex I and suggest again the desirability of applying
from within Canada if infirmity is a consideration. Another example involv-
ing a person from India took only two years from date of application until
refusal by a Board decision. There, it seemed decisive in not allowing the
appeal on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, that the sponsored
mother was living with two of her daughters both of whom had university
degrees and that two other siblings also lived in India.21 In another case,
shocking in its crass sense of the meaning of humanitarian and compassionate
grounds, the sponsor put $246,000 in a trust to pay an irrevocable joint life
policy for the benefit of a step-brother with Down's Syndrome in order to
bring in his aged father, step-brother and step-sister. The board noted in
addition that the father's worth was $1.5-2 million.22
II. MEDICAL EXAMINATION AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE
A. Authorization
The requirement that every person who is seeking permanent residency must
undergo a medical examination is established by s.11 (1). The Act then
19. Supra, note 14.
20. Supra, note 11.
21. Parmar v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1987), 3 Imm. L.R.(2d) 304 at
309 (I.A.B.).
22. Chiu v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1988), 6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 86 at 88-
89.
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prohibits admission to Canada on particular findings related to medical
condition by s.19 (1) (a):
19. (1) No person shall be granted admission who is a member of any of the
following classes:
(a) persons who are suffering from any diseases, disorder, disability or other
health impairment as a result of the nature, severity or probable duration of
which, in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at least one other
medical officer,
(i) they are or are likely to be a danger to public health or to public safety, or
(ii) their admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause
excessive demands on health or social services;
The opinion of the medical officers concerning the two criteria of
s.19.(1)(a)(i) and(ii) is to be determined in accordance with the factors
set out in s.22 of the Regulations pursuant to the authorization in
s.114(1)(m).
The proposed new wording for this section is
(a) persons who, in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at least
one other medical officer, are persons
(i) who are or are likely to be a danger to public health or to public safety, or
(ii) whose admission would cause or might be expected to cause excessive
demands, within the meaning assigned to that expression by the regulations,
on health or prescribed social services; 23
The ambiguity around the authority of the medical officer which this wording
attempts to resolve is described below. That resolution may have been
intended to address the authority of the Immigration Appeal Board in addition
to the authority of the visa officer, but it is hard to believe that the tribunal
would accept that interpretation without the statute being more specific. The
attempt to define standards of excessive demands on health or social services
is anticipated by the phrase "within the meaning ... services." The use of
"prescribed" would seem to imply that the physician who provides the initial
report to the medical officer would have to have prescribed a social service
for it to be taken into consideration by the medical officer but it could also
mean that medical officers may find a social service prescribed in the Medical
23. Bill C-86, supra note 4 at 18, s. 11.
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Officers Handbook24 which we describe below. If the latter, then problems
of fettered discretion would be increased; if the former, then applicants would
have an increased ability to influence the application of.this standard by
discussing care and services with physicians before the report is sent.
B. Meaning of the Statute
Many of the terms in s.19.(1)(a)(ii) of the Act have been litigated and bear
examination.
1. Medical Officer
This term is defined in s.2(1) of theAct. It is not the case that the person referred
to here is the person who actually examines the applicant. The medical officer
in fact reviews the report of another physician of the applicant's own choosing
in Canada or the United States or a physician chosen from among a prescribed
list in other countries. The medical officer reports to the Department of National
Health and Welfare and is authorized to perform his or her duties by the
Department of National Health and Welfare Act.25
The qualifications of medical officers are not that they be knowledgeable
about demands in Canada for various types of health and social services and
the type of strain that any additional users might put on these services.
Medical officers must merely be "qualified medical practitioners": s.2 of the
Act. They have no training in economics and few economic facts on which
to base decisions. They do not consider individual economic factors when
making economic decisions. They are both without training in law and
uninformed about legal determinations regarding their decisions.
While waiting lists for some health services (an irrelevant criteria according
to Ng 26) might be known to medical officers as physicians, it is unclear how
other determinations about demands for health and social services are related
to their special fields of knowledge and their decisions. In Ahir,27 it was
evident that in ignoring the visitor/immigrant distinction, the actual needs of
the applicant had also been ignored. Aparticular condition had somehow been
rubber-stamped as creating an excessive demand on services. In Hong Ngoc
24. Health and Welfare Canada, Medical Services Branch, Medical Officers' Handbook
Immigration MedicalService (amended 1986) [hereinafter Handbook].
25. R.S.C. 1985, c.N-10, s.4(2)(c).
26. Supra, note 12.
27. Ahir v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1983), 49 N.R. 185 (F.C.C.A.)
[hereinafterAhir].
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Le 28 it was found that "there was no evidence whatsoever that the government
medical officers ever turned their attention to the social services that might
be required." How can that be? In hearings on this process in 1986, it was
said by a witness for Health and Welfare Canada that "guidelines" on "cost
factors" are available to the medical officers and these are considered with
respect, for example, to "excessive demands on your social welfare systems"
in weighing admissibility.29 Yet nowhere is the training as economists that
would be necessary to make the sort of complicated calculation and study of
various conditions indicated. This testimony was flatly contradicted in the
Handbook30 used by Medical Officers which was revised the same month as
the 1986 hearings. The absence of any quantitative basis on which to form
judgements regarding the demand on services as required by the Act was
frankly admitted: "It follows then that it is not possible at present to establish
quantitative guidelines based on statistical analysis of Canadian health and
social care experience in order to differentiate the [categories related to
excessive demand on health and social services]." 31 The type of sophisticated
considerations which should go into such guidelines are usefully outlined in
the Handbook prior to this admission.
In addition to a lack of quantitative information and the training to analyze
it, medical officers do not have before them the documentation which could
help the officer to decide who would be bearing the cost in the particular case
and, hence, who would be deprived of services as a consequence. In fact,
medical officers are specifically directed not to take such individual factors
into account: "It is not the function of a medical officer to form an opinion
based on or influenced by civil factors, such as the economic circumstances
of the applicant, but solely on the medical considerations specified in the Act
and Regulations.' 32 Yet, of course, those "medical" considerations include
28. Hong Ngoc Le v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (November 25, 1986),
No. T86-9204 (I.A.B.) referred to in D.G. McCrea, "Medical Inadmissibility" in
Immigration Law (Materials prepared for a Continuing Legal Education Seminar
held in Vancouver, B.C. on April 6, 1990 by The Continuing Legal Education Soci-
ety of British Columbia) at 2.1.07 [hereinafter McCrea].
29. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Labour,
Employment and Immigration "Respecting: Pursuant to Standing Order 96(2), an
examination of medical guidelines used for assessing immigrants" (House of Com-
mons, Issue No. 9, December 3, 1986) at 9:44 [hereinafter Minutes, 1986].
30. Supra, note 24.
31. Ibidi at 3-9.
32. Ibid. at 3-4.
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factual, statistical and economic questions unrelated to medical. training.
Among those listed in s.22 of the Regulations are these:
(e)whether the supply of health or social services that the person may require
in Canada is limited to such an extent that
(i) the use of such services by the person might reasonably be expected to
prevent or delay provision of those services to Canadian citizens or perma-
nent residents, or
(ii) the use of such services may not be available or accessible to the person;
(g)whether potential employability or productivity is affected, and
(h)whether prompt and effective medical treatment can be provided.
Contrary to this concept of the appropriate mode of decision making is the
reasoning in Ng on the determination of the demand on social services: "We
beg leave to doubt that, given the evident love of Mrs. Ng for her mother,
there will be any demand on social services." 33 It is important to note, as
well, that the ability to show that there are services in the area in which the
applicant will reside which are sufficent to meet the needs of the applicant
and that the use of them will not strain the services is a defence to this ground
of inadmissibility.
34
Because there has been much litigation around the terms of the criteria, one
would expect that medical officers would also need some training in legal
matters regarding the meaning of the considerations and judgements to be
made and regarding how new case law is delineating that meaning. Yet one
authority states that most medical officers are unaware of the existence of
section 22 [the Regulation which defines the considerations to be taken into
account by the medical officer]. 35 In fact, the Handbook quotes s.22 without
identifying it as such. 36 However, Dr. B.S. Leslie, Director of Immigration
Medical Services, Department of National Health and Welfare, has stated that
Immigration Appeal Board reversals of medical decisions have "no impact on
guidelines." 37
Thus while fully half the opinion to be reached by the medical officers is
based on analysis of service demands and the ability of a complex and varied
33. Supra, note 12, at 316.
34. Hong Ngoc Le, supra, note 28.
35. McCrea, supra, note 28 at 2.1.04.
36. Supra, note 24 at 3-1 to 3-2.
37. Supra note 29 at 9:44.
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socio-political structure to meet them; they have neither the training to
determine the capacity of the structure nor are they given anyone else's
studies on which to base their estimates. Quite simply, their opinion on
these matters is based on no evidence. John Evans, in discussing the
significance of the decision in Keeprite,38 states that it established "that
a complete absence of evidence for a material finding of fact constitutes
jurisdictional error by an administrative tribunal. ' 39 Alternatively, accord-
ing to Keeprite, this is established by s.2(3) of the Judicial Review
ProcedureAct.40 Most importantly this thrust of Keeprite is similar to that
in CUPE4 1: "On matters primarily entrusted to the determination of
administrative agencies, fact-finding and the interpretation of the govern-
ing legal framework, the courts are entitled to insist upon a minimum
standard of rationality."'4
2
It follows that if the opinion of the medical officers is meant to decide any
of the non-medical issues raised by s.22 of the Regulations then the opinion
must be regarded as an error of law or of jurisdiction. If the statute intended
that the decision be based on s.22 (e) but without any evidence about the
existing social services then, in accordance with the Canadian Bill ofRights43
following the opinion of Beetz J. in Singh, it must be declared of no force
and effect. There Beetz J. quotes with approval the opinion of Pigeon J. that
decisions to be in accord with fundamental justice must be based on reasons:
"In the present case no indication was given tb the appellant of the reasons
for which her claim to refugee status was denied and, in my view, this raises
a very serious question." 44 Since the sponsor would be the appellant in this
case, there should be no problem of standing. Only if the opinion is regarded
38. Re Keeprite Workers' Independent Union and Keeprite Products Ltd (1980), 114
DLR (3d) 162 (Ont. CA).
39. J. Evans, "Remedies in Administrative Law" (1981) Law Society of Upper Canada,
Special Lectures on Remedies, 427 at 456-466 in J.M.Evans, H.N.Janisch, D.J. Mul-
Ian and R.C.B. Risk, Administrative Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publica-
tions Ltd., 1989) at 514.
40. R.S.O. 1980, c.224, now R.S.O. 1990, c.J.1.
41. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corpo-
ration [1979] 2 SCR 227.
42. Supra, note 39 at 515.
43. Canadian Bill of Rights, (1960) 8-9 Eliz.II, c.44.
44. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985), 1 SCR 177 at s. 29 quot-
ing Pigeon J. in Ernewein v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1980] 1
SCR 639 at 657 ff.
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as authoritative on the medical diagnosis and the consequences of that
diagnosis for the patient's needs, but not as determining whether the patient's
needs will create excessive demands on the health and social services avail-
able in Canada, can the medical opinion stand.
The courts, in deferring to medical opinions, have been following a well-
established principle of deference to expertise in administrative tribunals.
Just as clearly, however, courts have not failed to limit that expertise to the
area of knowledge in which it has training, experience and knowledge.
Deference cannot be justified in these circumstances.
2. "In the opinion of"
Following Uppa145 and the discussion above, the question of the degree to
which the opinion of the medical officer is binding on the visa officer is of
some consequence. Should this be read to mean that the medical officer's
opinion determines the question or that, without a medical officer's opinion
to the effect that one of the two conditions for inadmissibility exists, it is not
possible to arrive at the conclusion that the person is medically inadmissible?
The medical officers Handbook states that the medical officer's opinion is
legally binding as far as medical matters (meaning those in s.19(1)(a) of the
Act) are concerned. This view has been adopted in Stefanska as well: "As that
officer had before her a medical notification meeting the requirements of
s.19(1)(a)(ii) of the Act ... she no longer had any discretion and had no
alternative but to find the applicants, husband and wife, inadmissible." 46 The
IS Manual concurs but says such persons may belong to a category which
can be processed by a Minister's Permit.
47
Yet the contrary would seem to be implied by the reasoning in Uppal that the
Immigration Appeal Board must reconsider the opinion offered by the med-
ical officer. The majority agreed that the Board must not "shirk its responsi-
bility by claiming that it is not medically qualified." 48 The dissent in Uppal
argued that the Board was in exactly the same position as the visa officer and
that the medical officer's opinion was binding on both. The dissent like the
45. Uppal v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1987), 2 Imm.L.R.(2d) 143
(F.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Uppal].
46. Stefanska v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1988), 6 Imm. L.R.(2d) 66
at 73 (F.C.T.D.).
47. Supra, note 14, c.8, para. 8.19.4.
48. Uppal, supra, note 45 at 154 quoting Nandee v.Minister of Employment and
Immigration, I.A.B. 84-4095, December 24, 1985.
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majority in Sharma49 seems to ignore the wide range of non-medical consid-
erations that enter into the medical officer's opinion. As well, it tends to
ignore the scheme of the Act which allows appeals and discretion to issue
Minister's Permits to overcome what seems like the insurmountable barrier
of s.19. But most importantly, the dissent seems to imply that if the Board is
not bound, neither is the visa officer. This seems like the correct implication,
for the considerations, which according to the Regulations go into the medical
officer's opinion, include matters explicitly assigned to the visa officer's
decision by the Act. For example, s.19(1)(b) is substantially the same as
s.22(g) of the Regulation. This implies that the medical officer's opinion is
to be taken by the visa officer as advice in forming her or his own decision
about admissibility except insofar as it concerns medical diagnosis of the
individual without regard to health and social services. Thus in Liaquet the
Board stated a view opposite to that expressed in the IS Manual and the
Handbook "The medical officer is not to determine inadmissibility ... the
admissibility or inadmissibility of the person examined is not for the medical
officer to determine. That is for an immigration officer after receipt of the
proper opinion as defined in the Act."50 Visa officers following theISManual
would appear in most cases to have allowed their discretion and decision
making to have been improperly fettered because s.19(1)(a), as it currently
stands, may be interpreted to mean that the visa officer has discretion and the
power to decide admissibility after receiving the medical officer's advice.
The officer is bound insofar as in their opinion (i) or (ii) exists but it is their
decision whether or not (i) or (ii) exists. This problem will be addressed
further on. It is this issue which the new proposed Act would appear to be
trying to resolve by overturning Liaquet and affirming Stefanska.51 It does
this without affecting the decision in Uppal52 insofar as that decision is taken
merely to have established that the Appeal Board must reconsider the opinion
offered by the medical officer. The new proposed Act does not affect the
conflict between s.19(1)(b) and s.22(g) of the Regulations.
49. Sharma v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Immigration Appeal Board
Decision 83-6710, July 17, 1985.
50. Liaquat Ali Mohamed v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Immigration
Appeal Board T85-9648, July 27, 1987 quoted in McCrea, supra note 28 at 2.1.08.
51. Supra, note 46.
52. Supra, note 45.
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3. "are likely to be"/"might ... be expected"
While these two terms which occupy parallel positions in the Act may seem
to imply probability in the first case and mere possibility in the second case,
on examination it may be seen that to construe the second term in that way
would yield a criterion which could only be applied arbitrarily. Hence the
two terms must be read alike as requiring probability and any statement of
mere possibility is insufficent warrant for an opinion of medical inadmissi-
bility. This is stated clearly with respect to "might ... be expected" in
Hiramen53 a decision re-affirmed recently in Badwal.54 Of interest in these
two decisions is their definition of the role of the visa officer in assessing the
medical opinion. While Badwal is adamant that medical officer's opinions
(including opinions about the availability and use of services) cannot be
second guessed, it agrees with Hiramen that they must be scrutinized care-
fully for inconsistencies between the numbers assigned on the medical profile
or statements about inadmissibility and explanatory statements which imply
a different opinion.
Nonetheless, "probability" has been reduced by recent decisions to "possi-
bility" by requiring it to cover an indefinite length of time including perhaps
the entire lifetime of the individual. The longer the time span, the closer
possibility comes to probability. Recently admission was refused on exces-
sive cost grounds due to the "probability" that a child with Down's Syndrome
would develop senile dementia or Alzheimers thirty or more years hence. In
another case an evaluation over the "long-term" for a woman 55 years old
was required, again implying an estimate of the entire course of her life. 55
Such a criterion if applied consistently would render everyone inadmissible.
Clearly such a criterion has to be applied either arbitrarily or discriminatorily.
The time span in which the probability estimate should be made. would
53. Hiramen v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1986), 65 N.R. 67
(F.C.C.A.).
54. Badwal v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 9 Imm.L.R. (2d) 85
(F.C.C.A.).
55. Wong v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, No. T-2871-90 (Feb. 26, 1991)
(F.C.T.D.), cited in F.N. Marrocco & H.M. Goslett, The Annotated Immigration Act
of Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Carswell, 1991) at 59; Senile Dementia and
Alzheimer's "except for their age of onset, are clinically and pathologically indistin-
guishable." Adams and Victor, Principles of Neurology 2d ed., (1983) at 797 quoted
in Mong, supra note 11, at 134; the Handbook; supra, note 24, notes at 4-49 "Severe
dementia rises in frequency from less than 1% of the population at age 65-70 to over
15% by age 85." quoted in Parmar v. Minister of Employment and Immigration
(1987), 3 Imm. L.R. (2d) 304.
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perhaps best be matched with other waiting periods in the Act, for example,
the five year period before holders of Minister's Permits can be processed
for permanent residency.
4. "reasonably be expected"
InAhir56 this requirement was held to mean that the medical officer's opinion
must be formed by having regard to the individual circumstances of each
case. The test must be relevant to the purpose and duration for which
admission is sought. Finally, and perhaps least examined, the expectation
must be reasonable. 57 Mohammed suggests that not only must the medical
diagnosis be reasonable, which is the most common ground of appeal, but
that the opinion as to the consequences of the medical condition must also
be reasonable.58 Reasonableness is not established by "parroting a section
number" which implies that merely quoting the same section also does not
establish reasons for an opinion.59 Again the frank admission in the medical
officer's Handbook that there is no quantitative data on whichi to base a view
of consequences for social and health services implies the absence of reason-
ableness.
5. "excessive"
One of the most thorough and useful definitions of "excessive" has been set
out in Ng:
"That centres, of an unstated type, to which Mrs. Chan would or might rea-
sonably be expected to have resort, are overtaxed does not necessarily mean
that she would or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands
on those centres. 'Excessive' must indicate something out of the ordinary; a
superabundant demand or demand of an extreme degree. If hospitals or
health services are overtaxed, anyone having resort to them may cause a fur-
ther stretching or straining of resources. That is not consistent with saying
that their demands will be excessive. The test in the Act to which a medical
officer must turn his mind is not whether or not in his opinion an applicant
will place a demand on health services or social services or whether those
services or any of them are overtaxed or overstretched but whether in his
opinion the applicant's admission to Canada would cause or might reason-
ably be expected to cause excessive demands on health or social services." 60
56. Supra note 27.
57. Ibid. at 188.
58. Mohamed v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1986] 68 N.R.220
(F.C.C.A.).
59. Liaquat, supra note 50.
60. Supra, note 12 at 313.
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There are two significant elements in this definition. The first is that the
demand must be out of the ordinary which suggests a comparison not with
healthy immigrants but with users of the service or, less rigorously, with some
population sub-group having characteristics similar to that of the immigrant,
for example, the class of all elderly people over age 65. Secondly, the test
cannot be whether there is a waiting list for the services required by the
immigrant or that those services are already much in demand. To add to that
demand would not be excessive since the demand is already very strong.
The two points are useful in establishing that the medical officer's opinion
must address these questions and be far more specific. Given the dearth of
information available to medical officers on the actual services available and
the amount of use of these services made by various population groups, the
decision is useful in laying out questions which then will demonstrate the
vacuum in which this aspect of the medical officer's opinion is made.
Bala overturned the ruling in Ng by saying simply "I cannot, therefore, agree
with Mr. Eglington's test which would appear to ignore subss. 22(e) and (f)
of the Regulations which are quoted above."'61 Vice-Chairman Davey says
no more about how excessive demand is to be determined and what relation
the considerations in the regulations are to have to that decision. The Vice-
Chairman appears to believe that pursuant to s.22(e), any medical care or
hospitalization being required by the applicant or pursuant to s.22(f), any
service that may be needed (regardless of the stated or actual needs of the
applicant) which has any waiting list would yield a decision of inadmissibil-
ity. Yet the Regulations only require these factors to be considered; there is
no demand that they yield a particular result.
Ng notices that problem and describes what the condition related to these
considerations would have to be such that the person having it would be
inadmissible. Davey has, moreover, failed to distinguish the functions of the
categories in the medical profile whereby the opinion is conveyed and their
relation to the Act (in the case of the decisive "M" category) and to the
Regulations (in the case of the other categories which properly are more
advisory).
The problem is that this, decision like many others other than Ng, has not
asked how "excessive" is actually being decided by the officers and what
standard should be applied. In Bala and Ng, since the demand was clearly to
be borne by the family, no distinction was being made between publicly
61. Bala v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1988), 6 Imm.L.R. (2d) 303.
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financed services and privately financed services. It seems obvious in theAct,
and certainly was assumed in the Committee 62 testimony reported above, that
the demand with which the Act was concerned was that on publicly financed
services. In Bala, the slightest possibility of demand (made without any
comparisons with the rest of the population, much less in accord with the Ng
standard) was held to be sufficent to hold that the immigrant is inadmissible.
Again this standard is clearly one which could only be applied arbitrarily
since everyone will at some point in their life (at the very least, when they
die) become a greater burden on the rest of the population than the average
person at that time is. To see how arbitrary and discriminatory the standard
adopted in overturning Ng is, consider the immediate medical costs of
pregnancy and the long term social costs of childrearing. Yet, it would be
obscene to make entry conditional on never becoming pregnant. The Ng
standard suffers none of these problems.
Fortunately, in Jiwanpuri,63 Ng was upheld but, less happily, without expla-
nation or reasons. This was decided the same year as Bala in which the
overturning of Ng was also upheld. Thus the law cannot be regarded as settled
on this point. Ng is particularly relevant to our specific concerns as it involved
the sponsored immigration of elderly parents. The failure of medical officers
to apply standards which are related to the unique characteristics of this
group-that they are likely to be or become infirm (but, for example, that
they also will not become pregnant), that they are also likely to be immigrat-
ing because they will be cared for by their children, and that they are not
likely to create any more of a burden on public services than any other elderly
person-implies systemmatic discrimination against this group.
C. Ambiguity of the statute
Section 19 (1) (a) (ii) of the Act reveals two fundamental flaws. First, the
requirement of reasonableness is virtually impossible for medical officers to
meet. This arises because of ambiguity around the meaning of the words in
the Act, because medical officers by training are not able to decide the sorts
of questions required by s.19.(1)(a)(ii). Even if they had the training, the type
of information needed to answer these questions is not available. Specialists
in Epidemiology and Biostatistics might be able to provide the information
needed if it was clear what the Act was seeking. Secondly, these difficulties
are exacerbated by the lack of clarity about the degree to which the medical
62. Minutes, 1968, supra, note 29.
63. Jiwanpuri v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 8 Imm. L.R.(2d)
201.
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officer's opinion is decisive in ruling on the two issues determining admis-
sibility. Thus the ambiguity around who decides still leaves open the fact that
a decision about excessive demand cannot be arrived at by reason. Thus
within the requirements of the Act itself compliance is not possible.
The failure to achieve clarity in the Act and to ground decisions in reason
open the Act to attack by Section I of the Charter:
"The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."64
The meaning of "reasonable limits prescribed by law" has been held to have
two dimensions. The first bare minimum is that there be "an intelligible
standard".65 The second is that "it should be expressed in terms sufficently
clear to permit a determination of where and what the limit is."'66 This latter
requirement is related specifically to the definition of terms. Since "exces-
sive" enjoys no consensus about what it means and in any event there is no
informational basis on which to determine reasonably the use and availability
of social and health services, the Act meets neither test.
III. PROCESS LEADING TO DETERMINATION
OF ADMISSIBILITY
A. Forms and Physical
Applicants for permanent residency are to be given three forms: one is an
explanation of the medical admission process, a second is a list of designated
physicians for those applying from outside of Canada or the United States
and a third is the form to be filled out by the examining physician, form MS
1017. The form consists largely of check lists of various types of conditions
with the request that the physician explain any conditions indicated. The form
requires three other tests: a chest x-ray for anyone over 11, a blood seriologi-
cal test for syphilis for those over 15, and a urinalysis for those over 5. The
medical officer may request at their discretion specialists' reports or may
write to examining physicians for further information. Medical examinations
other than those done in Canada, are valid for 12 months only.
64. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c.11.
65. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney-General) (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at 617
(S.C.C.)
66. Re Luscher and Deputy Minister of Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise (1985),
17 D.L.R. (4th) 503 at 506 (F.C.T.D.).
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B. Determination by the Medical Officer
Form 1017 together with the x-rays and laboratory reports are sent to the
medical officers for evaluation. The evaluation is reported on form MS 1014
in the form of a "Medical Profile "which consists of six categories designated
by letters and the rating in those categories designated by numbers. A
summary of these categories appears in the IS Manual Chapter 8 Appendix
A. Only if the applicant is free of problems and hence admissible is this form
to be sent to the visa officer. Not only is the visa officer therefore unaware
of the basis of the medical officers' opinion, but the medical diagnosis
conveyed, which includes the medical profile, is to be phrased in lay language
so as to minimize "sensitive" information. For example, sexually transmitted
diseases are to be called simply "infectious diseases". Thus the visa officer
trying to exercise the discretion which is his or hers is prevented from
developing an informed opinion and from being able to judge whether the
medical officer has considered all relevant factors. We may see this with
greater clarity by looking at the categories in the medical profile.
The overall judgement about admissibility is a reflection of the categories in
s.19.
M1 = no health impairment
M2-M3 = risky health but may still be admitted
M4-M5 = not presently admissible but may be hi the future
M-6 =inadmissible due to danger to public health
M-7 =inadmissible due to excessive demand on services
The other categories of the profile are based on a reduction of s.22 of the
Regulations to 4 categories and a 5th category based on s.19(1)(b) of theAct.
Each category has a letter as follows:
H = Risk to Public Health or Safety - s.22(b)(d) of the Regulations;
D = Expected Demand on Health or Social Services - s.22(e);
S = Surveillance - s.22(c). This alerts the Province so that if a Minister's Per-
mit is issued, the applicant will be kept under surveillance;
E = Potential Employability or Productivity - s.22(g) of the Regulations and
s.19(1)(b) of theAct;
T = Response to Medical Treatment - the degree to which H and D might be
reduced as well as s.19(1)(b).
Excessive Demands on Health and Social Services
Only H, T and S are within t he expertise of physicians. The Handbook says
that E and T are related to s.19(1)(b) of the Act. Yet this section is not within
the purview of the medical officer under the Act and the Handbook admits as
much.67 Thus this aspect of the profile while influencing thejudgment arrived
at under category M in accordance with s.22 of the Regulations is still to be
decided by the visa officer.
It is important to note, inspite of the description by the IS Manual and in
profiles issued by the medical officers of the profile of the M category as a
"summation" of H, D, T, S, and E. that there is no overall score which is
derived from the numbers assigned under each of H,D,TS,and E in order to
arrive at the score under M. While some scores are related to other scores,
each one is in principle independent of the others. In other words, the
considerations leading to a judgement of inadmissibility are not thought of
as gradually building a case one way or the other and in fact, as we show
next, they operate more like a translation of a particular specific medical
condition into a specific set of letters and numbers. The "medical profile" in
effect is just another way to state a medical condition rather than constituting
an evaluation of an individual. This is why in Ahir68 rubber-stamping was
possible.
Medical officers are guided by the physician's evaluation to classify the
applicant by a particular ailment, provided he or she has one. The officer then
looks up the condition in the Handbook where the medical profile would
normally be found. Thus, for example, one finds the following entry:
6. Acute or chronic untreated or inadequately treated venereal disease
would usually be coded under criteria H6, D2, T2, E2, S5 and composite
M4-as a communicable disease with serious consequences when transmit-
ted; regarding medical care-usually ambulatory and usually effective, but
requiring serveillance; i.e., inadmissible, as likely to endanger public health,
but subject to review when adequate treatment has been completed. 69
Similarly, but more perfunctorily: "Patients with clearly established dementia
in the absence of the treatable cause [i.e., senile dementia or Alzheimer's
disease] are totally dependent and require considerable social service support
(M7)."70 Note that there is not the slightest hint of discretion allowed to the
67. Supra, note 24 at 3-3.
68. Supra, note 27.
69. Supra, note 24 at 4-3.
70. Ibid. at 4-50.
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medical officer in assigning "M7". While "opinion" suggests a professional
opinion and hence the intervention of discretionary judgement, the Handbook
has here completely fettered the discretion of the medical officer. The
implication of the Handbook's assertion about senile dementia is clearly that
not family support but social service support, that is, publicly funded support
is required. Yet authority suggests the contrary: " ... not all people with
dementia need to be institutionalized. It depends on severity and it depends
on the 'support systems,' such as a caring spouse.' '71 For another example,
in the case of a D6, D7 or D8, the Handbook prescribes an M7. Similarly,
those who are disabled are assessed by an additional set of functional
categories.72 For example, degree of continence, which yield an evaluation
which automatically places the applicant in M7 if help is required in any of
the categories or if the person is incontinent (see Appendix A attached).
C. Problems with the Process of Evaluation
The description of medical profiles above is derived from a study of the
Medical Officer's Handbook. It is instructive to compare that description
with the description in the IS Manual which may be presumed to be the view
of the profile adopted by the visa officer, an officer likely to believe that the
medical officer's opinion is "legally binding". Two important differences
exist, one in the description of the M category and the other in the explanation
of the relation of the other categories to the Act. The M category is described
in the IS Manual as "the summation" of H,D,T,S & E whereas we have seen
that an M7 may be assigned simply on the basis of a D categorization which
in itself may be based on a misconstrual of the meaning of "excessive" and
in any event is not based on any quantified or particular information about
the health or social services that are available. Secondly, the E category,
which is based on s. 19(1)(b) of theAct and hence according to the Handbook
is merely by way of advice to the visa officer, is described in the IS Manual
as related to s.19(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act.73 The effect of the opinion is
thus misconstrued insofar as the visa officer feels he or she has no discretion
71. J. Botwinick, Aging and Behavior (New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1984) at
140.
72. Supra, note 24, at 3-12, 3-13.
73. IS Manual, supra, note 14 at c.8 Appendix "A" p. 2. The Handbook, supra, note 24
at 3-3, para.10(a) describes this as related to s.19(1)(b) of theAct. A very recent case
reports the medical profile received by the immigration section. There the categories
are labelled in relation to the Act but category E is simply (if not coyly) left blank.
See Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d)
194 at 197 (I.R.B.A.D.)
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while the medical officer feels free to offer an opinion believing it may be
disregarded. The components of the M category which are not within the
competence of the medical officer and hence make it incumbent on the visa
officer to exercise discretion are rendered invisible. This removal of discre-
tion must, of course, be qualified by the option left to the officer of recom-
mending the issuing of a Minister's Permit.
The visa officer is thus both misinformed about the degree to which the
medical officers themselves regard the visa officer to be bound by their
opinion as well as by the actual legal requirement that they not be bound not
to admit those thought to be medically inadmissable in the opinion of the
medical officers. The medical officers themselves have their own discretion
improperly fettered because the entire profile in many cases and the question
of inadmissibility in most cases is determined by the classifications in the
Handbook. Thus, as Auerbach points out,74 the applicant is entirely alienated
from the process by which they are being judged. The decision they receive
from the visa officer has been dictated by the medical officer which has been
determined by the Handbook which in the case of D categorizations and
hence M7's are determined by guesswork based on neither quantified infor-
mation nor the individual's specific situation.
This pattern of discretion being improperly fettered has been carefully
censured by the courts. Allowing another branch of government to dictate the
decision for which one has responsibility under a separate act was forbidden
in Multi-Malls.75 Moreover agencies cannot give up all possibilities of
discretion by the adoption of rules, guidelines or general policies.76 The
decision in Yhap shows that such fettering of discretion is a jurisdictional
error: "The criteria much more strongly resemble inflexible self-imposed
limitations on discretion, which clearly result in the pursuit of consistency at
the expense of the merits of individual cases. I am of the opinion that this
fettering of discretion constitutes a jurisdictional error ....1,77
74. P. Harris Auerbach, "Discretion, Policy and Section 19 (1) (a) of the Immigration
Act" (1990) 6 J. L. & Social Pol'y 133.
75. Re Multi-Malls Inc. and Minister of Transportation and Communications (1976), 61
DLR (3d) 430 (Ont. HC Div. Ct.); rev'd (1977) 73 DLR (3d) 18 (Ont. CA).
76. In reNorth CoastAir Services Limited [1972] FC 390,406 (CA).
77. Supra, note 15 at 261.
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IV. WHEN MEDICAL INADMISSIBILITY IS DETERMINED
A. Minister's Permit
By authority of s.37.(1)(a) of the Act and more specifically as directed by IS
Manual Chapter 10, Paragraph 10.10 re family reunification and IS Manual
Paragraph 10.12 re medical inadmissibility, those who are not deemed
medically admissable may be admitted by a Minister's Permit.78 The Manual
states that issuing such a permit should be preceded by consultation between
the Director/Director General for Immigration in the Province to which the
applicant is going and the responsible medical officer and Provincial offi-
cials. Consultation is to concern public safety, financial and jurisdictional
factors IS Manual Chapter 10, Paragraph 10.26.1(b). Minister's Permits
which thereby surmount inadmissability are reserved in this case to spon-
sored members of the family class but may also include, depending on
circumstances, other close family members or refugees.79 The Ontario Min-
istry of Health is not to be involved unless the applicant his tuberculosis.
Thus, for those destined for Ontario, the visa officer makes a recommenda-
tion to the Regional office. If the Regional office decides against a permit,
the visa officer is so informed. If the Regional office agrees with the
recommendation for a permit, the Regional Executive Director must concur.
The visa officer is then advised to issue the permit. 80 Under s.38(2) of the
Act and according to the IE Manual Chapter 9, Paragraph 9.04(1)81 any
person who has resided continuously in Canada for at least five years under
a Minister's Permit may be landed from within Canada.
B. Appeals
If the application for a Minister's Permit is refused an appeal is possible to
the Federal Court (Trial Division) under the new Federal Court Act amend-
ments passed in February, 1992.82 However, unless it can be shown that in
the decision regarding the Permit procedural fairness was not granted to the
applicant there will be no ground of appeal. 83 Thus it is more likely that an
appeal of the medical inadmissibility decision itself would be the route
chosen if the Minister's Permit is not granted. In that case, an appeal to the
78. ISManua4 supra, note 14.
79. Ibd at c.10, paragraph 10.26.3.
80. Ibid. at 10.26.7.
81. 1E Manual, supra, note 14.
82. R.S.C., c.10 (2nd Supp.) as revised February 1992 in accordance with Bill C-38.
83. IS Manua supra, note 14 at c.10, para. 10.26, page 7.
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Immigration Appeal Board is allowed under sections 77 and 70 of the Act
and may be granted either on the grounds of law, fact or mixed law and fact
including jurisdiction or on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The
considerations described above, under Applications for Permanent Resi-
dency by Sponsored Parents - Procedure, above, for gaining permission to
apply from within Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds are
relevant here. The Board is established by s.57(1) of the Act and its jurisdic-
tion with respect to family class appeals is granted under s.69.4(2) If the
Immigration Appeal Board refuses to grant the appeal on either ground, then
there is an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal under the new Federal Court
Ac t84 and, with leave, under s.83 of the Act. Appeals must be on questions of
law including jurisdiction. If the appeal is turned down one might be able to
apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
C. The Time to Receive Reasons
A problem associated particularly with the appeal process in immigration
matters and rendered more complex by the discretionary relief provided by
Minister's Permits is that of the timing around appeals. Clearly, from the
perspective of a client with limited means, obtaining a Minister's Permit after
the applicant has been declared medically inadmissible is the best course. But
much depends on whether the Minister's Permit is granted at the time of the
decision or that only the intention to request it is given by the visa officer at
the time of delivering the decision to the applicants. If the latter then the
limitation period in which one can file an appeal will be running while one
is waiting for the Permit. If an appeal is launched while waiting for a Permit
and the appeal is lost, then by s.37(2) of the Act a Permit cannot be issued.
Appeals by sponsors must be filed within 30 days after the date the sponsor
has been informed of the reasons for the refusal.85 The reasons for refusal
are to be given at the time of the refusal to the sponsor under s. 77(1) of
theAct and s.41(1) of the Regulation. This however is not the complete
documentation of the reasoning that went into the decision. That documen-
tation is to be supplied only after the commencement of an appeal. 86 This too
84. Re Mauger and Minister of Employment & Immigration (1980), 119 D.L.R. (3d) 54.
For a reviewjof the appeal process see Nurchan N. Mawani, "Outline of Presenta-
tion on Medical Inadmissibility" in Immigration Law (Materials prepared for a Con-
tinuing Legal Education Seminar held in Vancouver, B.C. on April 6, 1990 by The
continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia) at 2.1.17.
85. Supra, note 82.
86. Immigration Appeal Division Rules (1990) SOR/90-738 at s.15. The Rules are
included in the Immigration IL Manual, supra, note 13.
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is not the complete record insofar as the medical decision is concerned. The
record supplied in event of an appeal is to include form MS-1014 described
above, which the visa officer may still have to obtain from the medical officer.
To receive the medical record prepared on the applicant by the medical
officers, which includes the "sensitive information" not contained on the
MS-1014, a separate request must be made and the record will only be
released if the applicant has signed the release on form MS-1017 (see III.B.
above).87 This will still not necessarily include the reports of the examining
physicians and, of course, it will not include the Medical Officer's Hand-
book88 to which even most visa officers do not have access. If an appeal is
then to be made after the Board makes its decision the application for leave
to appeal must be filed within 15 days of the Board's decision under s.83(2)
of theAct; yet, under s.69.4(2) reasons for Board decisions are only given on
request. Thus in all of these cases appeals must be launched without the
benefit of the reasons for the decision against which one is appealing or with
very little time to study them. Judging the chances of success is thus very
difficult. The Law Reform Commission has made suggestions for the
improvement of some aspects of this situation as yet to no avail.
89
V. DOES MEDICAL INADMISSIBILITY THWART
THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT?
A. Policy
With the process outlined above, several things should be noted. Those with
infirmities are likely to be determined to be medically inadmissible. The
flawed process whereby this will occur mechanically assumes that infirmities
which require assistance or require health care automatically render the
applicant medically inadmissible. There are two possible routes out of this
situation: Minister's Permits and by appeal, through the humanitarian and
compassionate clause or through a challenge on legal grounds. The second
is time consuming and costly. Both involve discretion. Finally the elderly are
more likely to need health and social services as we note in Table 1.90 Hence,
it should follow that the elderly would be ruled inadmissible in disproportion
87. Stefanska, supra, note 46 at 70; Bala, supra, note 61 at 312.
88. Supra, note 24.
89. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Obtaining Reasons Before Applying for Judi-
cial Scrutiny - Immigration Appeal Board, Report 18, (Canada: Minister of Supply
and Services, 1982).
90. Economic Council of Canada, New Faces in the Crowd: Economic and Social
Impacts ofImmigration (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991) at 12.
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to their numbers. Note there that it is not until age 75 that the health costs of
the elderly generally exceed the total costs of childrearing. Thus, even
compared to other age groups where health and social service needs have not
been considered, it is likely that the elderly will be considered medically
inadmissible out of proportion to other groups who use medical and social
services to the same degree. But regardless of that, clearly the discriminatory
effects of the excessive services standard will necessarily fall dis-
proportionately on the elderly. This meets the test for discrimination in
Brooks v. Canada Safeway, a case concerning health needs related to partic-
ular groups disadvantaged by society.91 Only if their health and social service
needs are measured against their peers could one expect a correct proportion
of admissions and there is no indication in the Handbook or the case law that
this is occurring.
The most fundamental reason that the Act should be interpreted in order to
respond to the peculiar needs of the elderly is that the interpretation should
be based on the purposes of the Act. The objectives or purposes of enabling
legislation have often been held to determine the proper interpretation of that
legislation. 92 Having explored the ambiguities and potential for abuse latent
in the Act it is crucial to understand the purposes of the Act so that interpre-
tation will not operate to subvert its intent.
Section 3 of the Act defines the objects of the Act and. hence immigration
policy in Canada. Two of those purposes are particularly relevant to our
concerns. First the reunification of families, to facilitate the reunion in
Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent residents with their close rela-
tives from abroad: s.3(c). Secondly "standards of admission that do not
discriminate in a manner inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms: s.3(f)". This second purpose means that s. 15 of the Charter93
has been extended by theAct to applicants regardless of their presence inside
of Canada. Thus the Act must not be interpreted in such a way as to
discriminate against the elderly. That discrimination against the elderly is a
common phenomenon has been well documented. 94 The capacity of the
91. (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.).
92. National Labour Relations Board v. Hearst Publications Inc. 322 US 111 (1944);
S.O.R.W.U.C. and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1977] 2 CLRBR 99
(CLRB, Dorsey, Vice-Chair).
93. Supra, note 64.
94. J. Botwinick, supra, note 71 at 34-36.
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medical inadmissibility procedure to generate systemmatic discrimination
has also been shown above.
The Act clearly can be seen to have been structured in accordance with the
purpose of family reunification. We have seen above that the Act and the
Regulations describe carefully the processes for admitting family members
and the priority to be given to them. This purpose of theAct is explained with
some care in Mohamed as "facilitating the reunion in Canada of Canadian
citizens with their close relatives from abroad." 95 The concern in the Federal
ImmigrationAct should be understood broadly in accord with the importance
placed by the Provinces on the duty of care for one's parents. The Family
LawAct, s. 32 obliges children to provide support for parents where needed.
96
While on a narrow interpretation, this means financial support, in
Ramaswami v. Andrew,97 a case where parents successfully sued for support
promised by their son in his undertaking as their sponsor for permanent
residency, it could be interpreted more broadly. Certainly, providing neces-
sities and care is less expensive and more in the spirit of the Act when the
parent is close by so that need can be recognized and met. Thus even if
Provincial and Federal vires may overcome any conflicting obligations under
these two Acts, the Family Law Act is still an indication of the broader intent
of family reunification. Then taking it as a principle of statutory interpretation
that the statute should be read as a whole and one provision cannot be read
so as to negate another, the fact of sponsorship by a Canadian of their infirm
parents should yield admission because of the needs of the parents not inspite
of those needs.
B. Statistics
The question then is to what degree have Minister's Permits and the purposes
of the Act acted to counter-balance the potential for thwarting immigration
of infirm parents? Is the discretion allowed by the Act working? Canada has
for some time had a population of which 16% are immigrants.98 Of current
immigrants roughly half came between the ages of 20 and 39 for a total of
1,845,385. 99 It is fair to say that each of these immigrants would likely have
95. Supra, note 58 at 222-223.
96. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 [formerly Family Law Reform Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 152 at 17].
97. (January 18, 1984) (Provincial Court (Family Division) of the Judicial District of
York) [unreported].
98. Statistics Canada, Profile of the Immigrant Population (January, 1989) Catalogue
93-155 (Minister of Supply and Services, Canada) at vii.
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left their parents behind. More specifically, between 1967 and 1977, 612,020
in this age group came to Canada and hence at this time have parents who
are or are approaching the need of their children's care due to old age and the
infirmities which accompany it.100 This implies a potential 1.2 million
parental immigrants. In 1988, 20,256 people over 50 immigrated to Canada
(Table II).101 While this is significant if multiplied by ten it is still only a
maximum of one sixth of the parents of the children who have immigrated
to Canada. Yet the immigration Minister in the Federal government's five
year plan regards this as too high. This rough estimate of potential
immigrants, of course, would have to be reduced by the emigration of the
children, by the death of parents and by those parents who simply want to
remain in their home country.
Table II
Permanent Residencies Granted in 1988 for those over Age Fifty
Age Male Female Total Total 1988 Immigration: 161,929
50-54 1959 2360 4319 1988 Family Class: 51,331
55-59 1876 2450 4326 1988 Assisted Relative 15,567
60-64 1987 2422 4409
65 plus 3089 4113 7202
Totals 8911 11345 20256
As well a proper statistical picture should include those who arrived in the
same period on Minister's Permits discounted by the subsequent landing rate.
The number of Minister's Permits issued is significant as shown in Table III,
but it is unknown what number of these were issued to infirm parents. While
by s.37(7) of the Act, statistics about the number of Minister's Permits are to
be made available annually, it was not possible to obtain statistics either more
detailed or more recent than those in this Table.1 02 The Director of Immigra-
99. Ibid. Table I at 1-5.
100. Ibid at 1-7.
101. Employment and Immigration Canada, Immigration Statistics 1988 (Ottawa: Minis-
ter of Supply and Services, 1989) at 23 and 53.
102. QLaw, database HWQ, Tuesday Oct. 10, 1978, Question No. 1,395 - Mr. Schu-
macher; Ans. by Hon. Bud Cullen. Mr. Cullen also said no statistics are kept on the
number of conversions to landing or on the number of re-issues.
Excessive Demands on Health and Social Services
tion and Medical Services claimed in testimony in 1988 that of 200,000
applicants considered for medical admissibility, only about 4,000 were
rejected 103 and of these many are able to enter Canada through Minister's
Permits and the humanitarian and compassionate clause. Since it is conceiv-
able that perhaps two-thirds of Minister's Permits are renewals, it is conceiv-
able that two to three thousand new permits are issued each year and possibly
a similar number of humanitarian and compassionate appeal board permanent
residencies are granted as well. It could be that those elderly parents who
have sought entry are able to gain admission in these ways. This is all
guesswork. Looked at from the other side, given the process and the standards
of admission, it is just as likely that thousands of elderly, infirm, parental
applicants are rejected every year. The cases of rejected parents we have
looked at must indicate common experiences. The number of those accepted
over 65 is, after all, quite small relative to the potential. Moreover, there is
no way to know how many Canadians inquired about the prospects of gaining
admission for their parents and then gave up.
Table I
Ministers Permits Issued Annually
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
No. 485 642 723 4,392 17,445 21,198 11,420 10;555
C. Conclusions
This examination of statistics suggests that discretion may be having a
significant impact but that it is likely there is still a significant problem of
rejections. Moreover, new proposals suggest that there may be increased
restrictions on the immigration of elderly parents. In order to judge the degree
to which discretion is working effectively to promote the purposes of the Act,
much more precise data is needed and it should be made readily available.
Among the statistics needed are 1) numbers of sponsored applicants by age
and relationship; 2) time to admission; 3) number of rejections by age,
relationship and by reason; 4) number of rejections subsequently admitted
by mode of admission; 5) number and type of medical inadmissibility by age;
103. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Labour,
Employment and Immigration "Respecting: Pursuant to Standing Order 96(2), fol-
low-up of the recommendations of the 9th Report of the Committee on Family
Reunification" (House of Commons, Issue No. 56, April 18, 1988).
(1992) 8 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
and 6) numbers of Minister's Permits, as renewals, by number of times
renewed, and by category of person using them. In the light of the problem
outlined above, it is astounding that none of this factual background is
supplied by the large package of materials supporting the new proposed Act.
Secondly, the interpretation of the Act and Regulations regarding medical
inadmissibility has significantly confused the roles and decisions of the
medical officer and the visa officer. While the medical officer's opinion about
medical inadmissibility should be a minimum requirement for a determina-
tion of medical inadmissibility, it is a misreading of the intent and concerns
of theAct to make it decisive and final. The medical opinion that an applicant
will need help should specify the range of care or services that seem to be
needed, leaving it up to the visa officer to determine in the particular case
and with regard to the particular destination what kind of demand will be
created.
Section 19(1)(a)(ii) of theAct is incoherent and without rational basis. When
applied to the elderly it is inherently more likely that they will be held
medically inadmissible than those in other age groups. Unfortunately, while
the problem is potentially large, the exercise of discretion to correct it is not
subject to empirical observation. Finally, if there are 4,000 rejections out of
200,000 applications and the system of discretion is working, why is the
entire system of medical inadmissibility required for sponsored parents over
age 65? Either the system is systemmatically discriminating and sys-
temmatically judging on the irrational basis described above or discretion is
overcoming the built in tendency of the system. In either case, the only
purpose for continuing this system for elderly parents is to contradict the
explicit intent of theAct.
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APPENDIX A
FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE DISABLED
(INFIRM) FROM MEDICAL OFFICERS HANDBOOK 104
L.R.E.S. - FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT
Independent/Intact - the person functions under ordinary circumstances
Independent/Limited - the person has a limitation and can function ade-
quately under modified circumstances
Dependent/Helper - the person functions appreciably better with assis-
tance, supervision, cueing, coaxing, or else a struc-
tured environment; another person is involved for
function
Dependent/Null - the person requires complete assistance or else the
activity is not performed
PERSONAL CARE ACTIVITIES
SELF-CARE Intact






Dress Upper Body ( )
Dress Lower Body ( )
Don Brace/Prosthesis ( )
Grooming ( )
Wash/Bathe ( )






















104. Supra, note 24.
Limited Helper Null




Note control without help: Note frequency of accidents:
Complete, Control, but with Occasional Frequent
voluntary urgency, or use some help or much
of cath, appl, supp. needed wet/soil
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () ()
MOBILITY Intact Limited
Note performance without help:
With ease, With difficulty,
no devices or with device,
no prior or with prior
preparation preparation
Transfer Chair ( ) ( )
Transfer Toilet ( ) ( )
Transfer Tub/Shower ( ) ( )
Transfer Auto-mobile ( ) ( )
Walk 50 Yards - Level ( ) ( )
Stairs, Up/Down 1 Fl. ( ) ( )
Walk Outdoors -
50Yards ( ) ( )
Wheelchair, -
50Yards ( ) ( )
Helper Null
Note degree of assistance:
Some help Totally
dependent
N.B. In the context of the functional assessment, devices includes such
things as feeding cuffs, special cutlery/dishes, dressing aids, transfer
boards/poles.
6. Explanation
(a) Individuals falling into the Intact category are performing indepen-
dently and would pose no demand for services apart from routine
medical supervision. I such an individual is employable, the require-
ment for replacement of wheel chairs, orthoses or prostheses would
not constitute an excessive demand.
Helper Null
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(b) Individuals having limited functions constitute the group which will
require the most careful evaluation. The number and availability of
the devices required and the level of ongoing care/supervision by
medical/social agencies in order to maintain the individual in the
community will have to be weighed against the individual's ability to
be productive prior to reaching a decision regarding admissibility.
(c) Individuals requiring the assistance of others (Helper or Null catego-
ries on the personal care activities scale) constitute and excessive
demand for services and would be categorized as M7.
(d) Application of the personal care activities scale to applicants having
disabilities secondary to ongoing medical conditions (rheumatoid
arthritis, multiple sclerosis) or conditions which may subsequently
undergo significant change (e.g. polio with occurrence of post-polio
syndrome) is recommended a well. An assessment of the applicant's
present functional status can be a valuable aid in assessing future dis-
ease course and predicting demand for services. (See 3.02 (2 & 3) )
(1992) 8 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT FROM MEDICAL OFFI-
CERS HANDBOOK
3.09 SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT
Health/ Demand Treatment Surveillance Employ- Medical
Safety Risk for Services ability Status
H D T S E M
No risk to Same as for No medical No Employable Admission
health or Canadians treatment surveillance in general not barred
safety required labour by health
market or demand
for services
Risk of Regular Generally Surveillance Restricted Risk
2 sudden medical effective; required; now fully insufficient 2
incapacity care; non- conditional employable to bar; no
minimum recurring for admis- in near demand for
hospitali- sion future or services
zation productive
Risk of At least Generally Surveillance Employable Demand
3 abnormal one major effective; required; or insufficient 3
behaviour hospitalizatio condition not productive to bar; no
n within 5- expected to conditional under risk to
7 years continued for permanently public
or recur admission restricted health or
conditions safety
Disease not Regular Partially Surveillance Likely to Admission
4 readily medical effective; by agree- deteriorate inadvisable 4
communi- care and condition ment (health or
cable; no recurrent expected to safety);
precautions hospitali- continue, reconsider
necessary zation possibility admission
of deteriora- in future
tion
Continued on next page
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Health/ Demand
Safety Risk for Services
Treatment Surveillance Employ-
ability
H D T S E M
Disease not Supervision No Surveillance Unemploya- Unadvisable
5 readily and special effective of those ble or un- (demand 5
communi- care but medical inadmissible productive for
cable but may be- treatment but who services)
surveillance come self- enter any- reconsider
necessary supporting way admission
in future
Disease Family care Retired Inadmiss-
6 readily at home ible: public 6
communi- indefinitely health or
cable: plus super- safety
dangerous vision reasons
Continuous Inadmiss-
7 care in ible: exces- 7
hospital or sive
other demand for
institution services
Rare or
8 limited 8
health or
social
services
Medical
Status
